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ABSTRACT
Avigail Eisenberg is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria.
She was also a fellow of CRÉUM during the 2004-2005 academic year. She has written important work
on the issues of identity, race, gender, minority rights, and in particular, Aboriginal claims. Her writing
displays intelligent and acute commentaries in which she demonstrates an ability to tackle difficult
questions in a refreshing way.
A list of her publications is available at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/eisenberg/pubs.htm.
Martin Blanchard of CRÉUM asked Professor Eisenberg if she would be willing to be interviewed via
email on the subject of an article she had just finished writing, entitled “Reasoning about the Identity
of Aboriginal People”. (This text is forthcoming in Accommodating Cultural Diversity: Contemporary
Issues in Theory and Practice, Stephen Tierney ed., London: Ashgate.) She kindly accepted to answer his
questions.
RÉSUMÉ
Avigail Eisenberg est professeure au département de sciences politiques de l’Université de Victoria. Elle
était également professeure invitée au CRÉUM durant l’année 2004-2005. Elle a écrit nombres d’articles
et d’ouvrages majeurs sur les questions d’identité, de race, de genre, de droits des minorités et, en parti-
culier, sur les revendications autochtones. Ses textes sont non seulement agréables à lire, mais ils font
preuve d’une intelligence et d’une finesse remarquables, où elle démontre une habileté à affronter des
questions difficiles de manière rafraîchissante.
Une liste de ses publications est disponible sur http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/eisenberg/pubs.htm
Martin Blanchard, chercheur au CRÉUM, a demandé au professeure Eisenberg si elle accepterait de faire
une entrevue par courriel à propos d’un article qu’elle vient de terminer, dont le titre est “Reasoning
about the Identity of Aboriginal People”. (Ce texte sera bientôt publié dans Accommodating Cultural
Diversity: Contemporary Issues in Theory and Practice, dirigé par Stephen Tierney, London: Ashgate.). Elle
a aimablement accepté de répondre à ses questions.
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1. Martin Blanchard (M.B.): Hi Avigail! It’s really nice to be able to talk
with you again. I have just finished reading your excellent paper,
“Reasoning about the Identity of Aboriginal People” and I would like to
ask you a few questions about the subject of Aboriginal identity and how
this affects our understanding of politics and, in particular, what this
means in terms of making space for identities in political institutions.
I will begin with a statement that summarizes the paper. You write at the
outset that “some assessment of minority identity is usually an inevitable
part of the process of deciding whether a minority practice or set of rules
ought to be prohibited by or protected from public regulation”. The
important word here is “identity”, by which you seem to understand not
only this or that practice that a given group claims to be central to its exis-
tence; identity, if I read you well, is also the particular meaning that a
given group assigns to a practice, or set of practices and institutions. For
instance, not only are hunting and fishing activities part of an Aboriginal
identity, but identity would also be what it means for a particular
Aboriginal group to make these activities central to its way of life. Your
claim would then be that stories, or narratives, that mediate the meanings
that a particular group confers to its activities form an “inevitable part” of
designing public policies and institutions. 
I would like to know where this definition of identity stands concerning
what has been labeled the “politics of recognition”. Is identity merely
some kind of “information” that will serve political stability, institutional
design, and other ends? Or should we understand identity as some kind of
good that deserves recognition by itself, just as equality and liberty can be
defended as goods that deserve recognition for the sake of equality and
liberty, and not only for the sake of stability? If you prefer the second
answer, how should we understand the following: that, as you say, we
may have to include identity claims in our political understanding
because they “lead directly to a set of complex issues at the heart of how
well or poorly minorities are treated”? In other words: what is the status
of identity in a sound conception of politics? Is identity worth pursuing
for its own sake, or should it be anchored to more fully developed claims
of equality and the like?
Avigail Eisenberg (AE): Hello Martin. Thanks for these great questions
and for the opportunity to develop answers in this format. The particular
question you pose brings together several different concerns that I think
are very interesting in the context of thinking about diversity and differ-
ence in Canada.  
I think that in some contexts, identity is a primary good in the sense that
Rawlsian liberals understand the idea of primary good. Let me try to
explain this more completely. 
If we understand identity as Taylor asks us to, as a matter of the self-
understanding of an individual or the collective self-understanding of a
group, then the conditions required to sustain a particular identity, or to
sustain the activity of developing or living that identity, are surely funda-
mentally important within any worthy society.  The aim of much liberal
philosophy is consistent with establishing these conditions of self-under-
standing even if, according to critics, liberals fails to meet this aim. Many
liberal debates can be interpreted as debates about what conditions have
to be in place so that individuals can develop and explore their self-under-
standing or identity. So a core question for contemporary liberalism is
what terms are fair terms for the development of one’s identity? 
Ideally, liberalism is committed to facilitating political relations in which
individuals are secure about their identities and, by and large, the aim of
liberal governance is to ensure that some of the key conditions are in place
to allow individuals to develop their identities as they choose. But liber-
alism has had some important blind spots or failures when it comes to
establishing fair terms for individuals and groups to develop their identi-
ties. Two important failures are related to: 1) liberalism’s cultural bias;
and 2) liberalism’s colonial bias. Let me say something about the cultur-
al biases of liberalism in response to your question. 
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Will Kymlicka has written extensively about liberalism’s cultural bias,
especially in arguing that benign neglect is an incoherent position for the
state to take about cultural accommodation. (Others (e.g. Uma Narayan)
have described the problem as the ‘false universalism’ of liberalism.) It
seems to me that Kymlicka’s account does a great job in exposing the
problem of benign neglect and proposing as a solution an agenda that
requires a state that is more actively involved in cultural accommodation.
However, his solution has raised a number of concerns amongst which is
that it relies too heavily on a powerful state, that it increases the power of
the state over minorities, and that there is no reason to believe that the
state is a benevolent or uninterested actor in relation to minorities. 
I think these are interesting criticisms. They raise all sorts of questions about
how to ensure that the state doesn’t use its powers to govern cultural minori-
ties in ways that only help to augment state power over minorities and
respond effectively – but perhaps not justly – to threats to state sovereignty
posed by minorities. The problems they identify should lead us to scrutinize
more closely the ways in which the state makes decisions about minority
accommodation. Given the interests of the state in ensuring stability, given
the aims of justice, and given the problems of cultural/colonial bias and
essentialism, can decisions about the accommodation of cultural and reli-
gious minorities be made in a way that is fair to the minority groups con-
cerned? 
This is a task that Kymlicka doesn’t get into beyond proposing the broad dis-
tinction between internal restrictions and external protections. And this dis-
tinction is, in some ways, too broad because most cultural practices are both
internal restrictions and external protections. Because most cultural practices
are not neatly categorized, the distinction requires that we make fair judg-
ments about whether a practice is more an external protection or more an
internal restriction. In fact, pragmatically, it necessitates that such judgments
are made by an adjudicative body, or a deliberative public empowered to do
so. Here is the state in action, applying its discretion in a manner that will
make all the difference to the ways in which minorities are treated. 
In order to control the discretion used by the state to decide whether a
practice is more like an external protection of internal restriction, it would
seem necessary to determine what counts as an external protection/inter-
nal restriction from the point of view of the minority group and how that
might differ from the point of view on the matter of the mainstream com-
munity. As you correctly suggest, a group practice derives its meaning
through its role in the narrative of that group. If we want to understand
how the practice contributes to the character and quality of autonomy
enjoyed by individuals in relation to that group or how the practice gives
expression to and shapes the range and meaning of opportunities open to
individuals as group members – that is, how the practice contributes to a
context of choice – then we have to know something about the group’s
identity and the role of the practice in that identity. 
For this reason, the project of protecting minority rights inevitably
involves understanding something about the group’s identity, and how
that identity bestows meaning on a range of opportunities and choices.
Therefore, protecting minority rights fairly often requires that institutions
assess minority identities. From this the question arises how institutions
can assess minority identity fairly. 
This process of assessing minority identity is not the same as protecting
any given identity or treating any identity as valuable no matter what
practices or values it endorses. The task of understanding cultures with
some accuracy does not mean endorsing any culture’s view of how to live.
Charles Taylor’s view, which seems correct to me, is that there has to be
a presumption in favour of the value of a culture, but not an automatic
endorsement of any cultural practice. No doubt some cultural practices
should be banned. The question though is what is a fair way to reach that
decision? Sometimes, elements of a group’s narrative have to be regulat-
ed or banned because of their consequences for other groups and some-
times the effects of a practice on some group members provide good rea-
son to restrict a practice. Sometimes, the reasons for prohibiting a prac-
tice have to do with its impact on the environment or on animals – e.g.
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certain forms of animal slaughter might simply be too cruel, by any cred-
ible standard, for the state to allow them even if a cultural or religious
group considers them required within their way of life. Few people dis-
agree that traditions and practices ought to be restricted in some contexts.
In fact, cultural and religious traditions anticipate such restrictions
through internal rules that delineate exceptions (e.g. fasting rules or cir-
cumstances where eating forbidden foods is allowed). The question of
whether or not there ought to be restrictions in some contexts is not at the
centre of most controversies. Rather, the more difficult question, at least
for public institutions that aim to treat people as equals within diverse
societies, is when such restrictions ought to apply and what sort of reason-
ing procedure ought to be followed in order to determine whether to pro-
hibit a controversial practice. This reasoning procedure inevitably impli-
cates institutions in reasoning about a group’s identity.
So what it means to treat members of minority groups as equals is to con-
sider the ‘lay of the land’ from their vantage point, which in part is their
identity. Doing this is not only a means to learn information about the
minority in question, but also to learn about the dominant group and the
ways in which rules and practice may sustain and shape their identity-
related interests and undermine those of others. 
What I have in mind (roughly) is an inquiry that would pose the follow-
ing questions: 1) Are rules, regulations and procedures neutral amongst
different group practices or do they advantage some groups and disadvan-
tage others?; 2) If the rules or their effects are biased in terms of how they
impact the identity of some communities, why are the rules in place?
What values or practices are the rules meant to protect? How well – i.e.
directly and effectively – do they protect them? Often these reasons are
also matters related to identity – e.g. the need to protect the identity of
another group or the need to protect the identity-related interests of indi-
viduals to dissent or to be treated as equals. These considerations have to
be brought out into the open, assessed and weighed. 3) On balance, which
has stronger identity-related considerations attached to it, the values or
practices protected by the rule or the harm done to the group’s identity by
the rule (and thus by prohibiting the group’s practice)? The precise way
in which all this is carried out– the standards and values that are used as
a guide to reasoning about the identities of minorities – capture, in part,
what it means to treat people as equals. 
In relation to liberalism’s second blind spot, namely, colonial bias, I think
the problem is much more serious. The state is so much more of a protag-
onist in these relations that it is difficult to modify state institutions so that
they fairly (and legitimately) assess the identities of groups of people that
the state has exploited and subjugated. We shouldn’t expect, for instance,
the Supreme Court of Canada to render a decision that fundamentally
draws the sovereignty of the Canadian state into question (although some
decisions have come close to doing so). But in some cases about
Aboriginal rights, Canadian sovereignty is precisely what is at issue. So
conflicts that are heavily informed by questions of Aboriginal self-deter-
mination and which involve a search for post-colonial values can’t be
solved in the way that I have sketched above in relation to cultural accom-
modation. But I think that questions of identity are nonetheless relevant
here as well. 
2. MB- Am I reading you right in thinking that revealing the colonial bias
of liberalism is an important, or even a strong virtue of identity? That
assessing Aboriginal identities in Canadian institutions would lead us to
make our colonial past explicit and help us do something about it? If so,
how would you qualify a post-colonial relation between institutional prac-
tices and group identities in Canada?
AE- Yes, you are reading me correctly. I think that grappling with prob-
lems and conflicts amongst people in terms of identity is a way of under-
standing how public institutions and structures have to be
shaped/reshaped in order to treat people fairly. At the moment, there is a
heightened anxiety in the public and amongst scholars about identity pol-
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itics – I’ve called it  “identity wariness”.  I think the exact opposite
response is required – we need to confront the challenges posed by iden-
tity directly, carefully, transparently, with humility, but also with some
degree of confidence that sometimes there are good reasons to restrict
minority practices and these reasons can and should be articulated and
defended publicly. Also, sometimes there are no such good reasons and
this has to be acknowledged. We might think that the difficult task of con-
fronting the identity-related nature of claims directly can be avoided. But,
doing so does not translate into avoiding the indirect consideration of
identity in relation to political decision-making. Rather, avoiding a direct
approach invites decision-makers to apply their own discretion about a
minority’s identity in deciding, for instance, what shari’a is all about and
whether Muslims need access to it in arbitration processes; whether
French is really threatened in Quebec and therefore needs special legisla-
tive protections in relation to commercial sign laws; whether Aboriginal
ways of life are more collective than individualistic in ways that justify
different means of political representation. It is when we apply our own
discretion to such matters that problems with respect to identity emerge
and social conflict becomes more likely. 
Our institutions have to engage in a process of responding to threats posed
to the identities of groups without engaging in objectionable forms of
essentialism or applying ethnocentric biases. They have to figure out how
to weigh identity claims with other sorts of claims (like physical harm)
and, most importantly, they have to uncover the ways in which more often
than not, competing identity claims are at stake in many conflicts.  
With respect to post-colonial relations, there is no reason to think that any
one approach will be adequate to reach this goal. But the willingness of
Canadian institutions to frame problems in terms of competing identity-
related claims might be a step in disassembling colonial reasoning within
public institutions today because this step draws into question the discre-
tion related to matters of identity which decision-makers and the public
use all the time in assessing Aboriginal peoples. Our institutions are not
neutral towards Aboriginal peoples. Rather they sustain the identities –
self-understandings, historical myths, ways of life, practices, etc. - of
mainstream Canadian society and may undermine the identities of other
communities. This is not to suggest that our goal should be creating ‘neu-
tral’ institutions and rules. I’m not sure that neutrality is always possible.
But being neutral and being fair are two different standards sometimes.
The fairness question depends on whether and how institutions or rules
might undermine the identities of minority groups and whether they ought
to be reformed. 
An approach that focuses on the ways in which rules, practices, institu-
tions, and regulations happily sustain some identities and undermine or
threaten others is bound to draw into question the fairness of Canadian
political and legal institutions in relation to Aboriginal peoples. But the
matter of Aboriginal identities is complicated. Under relations of domina-
tion, communities and individuals often adopt values and practices, which
become part of their identity and ways of life, as strategies for survival.
Sometimes these practices are best abandoned and sometimes they are
not. Taiaiake Alfred has suggested that Aboriginal people should pick and
choose amongst practices, structures, and norms those that will strength-
en the community and lead them into the future – what he calls self-con-
scious traditionalism. Aboriginal communities experience a host of inter-
nal conflicts and disputes about which practices ought to be at the heart
of their community’s identity and which ought to be abandoned or made
to be more marginal. 
Another reason why an identity-based approach is bound to draw into
question the fairness of Canadian political and legal institutions in rela-
tion to Aboriginal peoples is because mainstream institutions and society
are also shaped by colonialism. But there is a far less active and honest
debate in mainstream Canada about how to pick and choose amongst
practices, structures and norms those which will best see us into the
future.  Mainstream institutions in Canada were shaped partly by the need
to create and sustain dominance over Aboriginal people. I think an
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approach that highlights the identity-related features of these practices
and structures will make vivid the ways in which mainstream institutions
are implicated in identity politics and how (or whether, in relation to
Aboriginal peoples) they might be reformed.
3. MB- In relation to what you have said about mainstream Canada, what
do you think of the role of jurists in these affairs? I sometimes think that
it is a good thing that jurists can at least offer a solution, whereas many
politicians stubbornly refuse to contemplate identity claims. But notwith-
standing easy critiques of our political institutions, will it not eventually
become a problem if jurists take the lead in recognizing different identi-
ties? For instance, Court activism could degenerate into some kind of
hyper-formalism where the text of the Constitution and past judgments
would replace political debates. The solution could be to press for more
deliberative societies, but then a new problem appears, that of reconciling
deliberation with identity – something that scholars have mainly done in
the appreciation of deliberation instead of identity (except for extraordi-
nary persons such as yourself and Melissa Williams, for instance). Do you
see the lack of political courage degenerating in this kind of way? 
AE – Political courage is a great way of putting it. I agree that we don’t
want hyper-formalism or judicial activism to replace democratic deliber-
ation and decision-making. But here are a few points to consider along
these lines. 
First, it’s true that it is difficult to get the public to consider things in a
light that it refuses to consider. But I’m not sure that this is the situation
which confronts us. Imagine, for instance, a deeply patriarchal public and
the prospect of getting such a public to take seriously the idea that women
are political equals. When people undertook that project (and as they con-
tinue to pursue it today), they did so partly by drawing on values that were
already viewed by that public as important. In many cases, the problem is
not that the basic values that we hold dear are the wrong ones. Rather, the
problem is the cultural blinders that have been employed to give practical
expression to these values and the way in which, sometimes, the practical
ways of giving expression to normative values are thought to be synony-
mous with the values themselves. So the problem is not political equality.
It’s how political equality is translated into practice under patriarchy and
then how these practices are viewed as the ‘best’ means to expressing
equality even though they clearly have the effect of disadvantaging
women in politics. 
Identity-related considerations are already implicitly used to make sense
of many conflicts. In some cases, we can’t avoid such considerations. So,
the assessment of identity is already pervasive in decisions involving
minorities. But such assessments are often based on stereotypes and prej-
udices, false universalism, lack of information, and un-reflexive reason-
ing. Moreover, this private discretion is applied all the while public deci-
sion-makers claim to be neutral and unbiased. The result is often that
minorities and Aboriginal people consider public decisions in Canada to
be racist, colonialist or biased in other ways. We need to ensure that these
reasoning processes are more transparent and fair. We can’t do this with-
out confronting the fact that the assessment of identities is sometimes an
unavoidable part of democratic decision-making. 
Second, this project has to take place on several fronts – by reforming
legal and political institutions, and generally, by holding the public
accountable for the standards used in public debate. I’ve always thought
that it’s a mistake to think of the court as outside the deliberative sphere
of politics. Courts contribute to political processes by setting standards of
fairness towards minorities and by distilling from political and public
debate the values and reasons that ought to be employed in setting those
standards. This isn’t to suggest that courts don’t act independently in the
political process. Their mandate, even in a political atmosphere hostile to
judicial activism, is to protect the substantive values which ensure that
democratic processes are fair – i.e. which ensure that everyone has polit-
ical voice. Nor do I mean to suggest that courts can’t be leaders and act
against the public in ways that force or forestall political change. But they
108
WORKING
PAPERS
DOCUMENTS
DETRAVAIL
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E   ! V .  1  N .  1   ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G  2 0 0 6
can’t do that for very long; that is, rarely if ever can courts resist persist-
ent political and public opposition to their decisions. 
The decisions of courts offer good examples for political research about
minorities because, in any given case, the court has to come to a determi-
nate decision and, at the appeal level, it has to do so on the basis of rea-
sons which are publicly accessible. Public debate and deliberation is obvi-
ously more open-ended. Outside the judicial realm, we also have political
institutions engaged in deliberative decision-making (e.g. commissions of
inquiry) where conclusions are reached and reasons are publicly accessi-
ble. We also have lots of rich research that can trace the ways in which
public debates occur through news media. Each of these forums is guid-
ed and influenced by the others. But some are easier to follow, have more
transparent reasoning processes and seem more determinate in their deci-
sion-making. 
4. MB- This exchange is so great that I can’t stop myself to ask one last
question! In your response to my first question, you assert the importance
of collective self-understandings as being fundamentally important to the
way persons see themselves. I totally agree with you on this issue, but in
my own work on identity, I have never stopped to question myself about
some problems facing identity claims. I hope I am not simply internaliz-
ing a critic’s viewpoint, but identity is in itself a multi-faceted notion, and
I find that some aspects are problematic. 
Let me push one of these problems further. It’s about identity being
accounted for in differences. One objection to identity claims is that
instead of relying on identity and differences, it will be justice and com-
monalities that will help Native peoples to find a way out of their subor-
dination. In other words, identity would be too narrow a concept to under-
stand claims about justice.
Aboriginal peoples seem to follow this point as well. For instance, some
Aboriginal persons have argued that we, as non-Aboriginals, cannot even
understand their point of view, because of the differences that separates
“us” from “them”. These differences are tracked in things like “their”
thinking in a circular way, while “we” are be trapped in a linear way of
thinking. But as you argue in your article, Aboriginals “have complained
that identity narrowly restricts the sort of claims they can make”. On the
one hand, Aboriginals claim that their particular identities makes it
impossible to understand them fully; on the other hand, they complain
that identity-based claims restrict the possible claims they can make.
Opponents of identity would point to these facts and propose to abandon
identity altogether – at least in political situations.
Some proponents of identity will bite the bullet and propose a difference-
based approach. In such an approach, one claims self-determination, for
instance, not for reasons of equality between groups, but, more controver-
sially, because one claims to be different – and different groups would
inherently possess their own self-determining rights. This may not be the
best way to qualify the difference-based approach, but in any case, I’d like
to hear what you have to say about these kinds of problems facing identi-
ty claims. Are they answered by an approach searching for commonalities
between groups, such as the minority rights approach? Or do such prob-
lems mean that the assessment of identity has to embrace a difference-
based approach, or at least part of it?
AE: I think this is an important question. There are aspects of a politics
of difference that have been highly successful and important – namely, the
idea that the means by which we give practical expression to considera-
tions of justice and fairness capture and have the potential to fulfill the
interests of some communities and individuals (often middle-class men
belonging to the mainstream culture) better than others. Thinking about
justice in terms of this difference has been generally helpful in political
theory.   
But, to clarify, I think it is important to distinguish between two positions
that have each come to be related to a politics of difference. One position
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holds that the explanation for Aboriginal oppression and subjugation is
that the values and practices of European setters are different from
Aboriginal values and practices in ways that settler society doesn’t fully
appreciate. These differences have caused disadvantage and oppression.
So alleviating oppression requires recognizing difference. I think this
position distorts the cause of injustice.
The second position is that Aboriginal peoples were purposively dispos-
sessed and subjugated by settler societies and that European policies
(which obviously reflected the values and practices of particular commu-
nities, with distinctive histories, fears, and values) were committed to
eliminating differences. So, the process of subjugating Aboriginal people
involved undermining Aboriginal value systems, family structures, gov-
ernance practices, and generally the ways of life that sustained Aboriginal
communities. I think that this second position captures more accurately
what happened historically in the Americas. 
This second position holds that injustice is not the product of cultural dif-
ferences amongst people. It might be the case that the way in which
Aboriginal and settler communities think is fundamentally different along
the lines that you’ve described. But we should resist concluding that these
kinds of differences account for the injustices suffered by Aboriginal peo-
ples at the hands of settler societies.  One reason is that by focusing on
cultural differences of the sort that you mention as the cause of injustice
we underestimate the enormous flexibility of liberal institutions and their
ability to accommodate all sorts of differences. The liberal project has
always entailed dealing with peoples’ differences. According to liberal-
ism, one of the best ways in which to deal with peoples’ differences is to
recognize their standing as unique individuals with the freedom to believe
what they want, to express whatever views they want as long as they don’t
cause others harm, and to join (and leave) groups as they wish. According
to one version of a liberal perspective, people can think in a circular man-
ner or a linear manner, or believe in all manner of supernatural beings,
without being persecuted. That is a fairly generous approach to difference.
It is not an approach that is free of bias or that comes without trade-offs.
But it is powerful. In part, what is impoverishing contemporary debates
amongst political theorists is a caricatured and misleading understanding
of just how ingenious and accommodating traditional and conventional
liberalism is. 
A second reason to resist placing too much emphasis on differences
amongst people is that doing so allows us to underplay the intentionally
cruel policies that have been applied to people in full knowledge of their
differences and regardless of any official commitments to equality and
individual well-being. Here I’m thinking about historical policies such the
residential schools and other measures of coercive assimilation that
Aboriginal people have suffered in Canada and elsewhere. These policies
were not the product of linear thinking or scientific rationality. Nor were
they policies that reflected a respect for individualistic values over collec-
tivist ones. These were policies of domination. They were, however,
linked to liberal programs, such as efforts to ‘civilize’ people as a means
to making them ‘fit’ for liberal citizenship. So they are part of liberalism’s
legacy even though liberals today may not take ownership of them. 
Another legacy of these kinds of policies, which is often under-acknowl-
edged within liberal scholarship, is that some minorities remain distrust-
ful of any mainstream attempts to improve equality and inclusiveness,
even when they use ‘new’ approaches like ‘a politics of difference’
‘recognition’ or ‘multiculturalism’. In the hands of the mainstream – i.e.
Canadian institutions – some minorities argue that these alternative
approaches, no matter how attractive in theory, will lead to just another
set of assimilationist measures. What is required instead, is rethinking in
a more wholesale way, the terms upon which relations amongst different
people are approached in the first place. That project is clearly a project
about equality and how to attain it. In this sense, the project is a common
project. But the requirement that this project be discussed and debated
solely through language of liberalism is, I think, unwise and unlikely to
lead to success. 
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But the project of justice is also about rebuilding institutions so that they
are truly inclusive and this means acknowledging that institutions, prac-
tices, rules and regulations sometimes have a different impact on differ-
ent communities in regards to significant identity-related differences. The
effect of mainstream institutions and practices may, in some cases, be that
they disable minority communities in unreasonable ways. Coming to this
conclusion and addressing it is partly what justice requires. But this
process is not the same as concluding that such differences are the root
cause and explanation for injustice.  
I have only half answered your question about the possibility of applying
a politics of difference within Canadian public institutions. On the one
hand, I think it is clear that some minorities might view Canadian public
institutions as too invested in the mentality of the dominant group and too
committed to keeping that dominant position to be the best institutions to
apply a politics of difference fairly. Whether they are correct or not about
these limitations, this is a problem of legitimacy that Canada (and many
other places) has to address.  On the other hand, I think we can and should
develop approaches within Canadian institutions to managing conflicts
amongst different groups that address differences fairly, reasonably and
transparently. Such approaches are already in operation in many institu-
tions. But they are practiced unevenly, inconsistently and without the
transparency that is required. In any case, the differences that exist
amongst peoples are not the problem. The problem is, in the first instance,
when approaches, especially those used by political institutions, fail to
assess collective identities in a transparent manner and according to crite-
ria that pass a test of fairness, and when instead public actors apply their
private discretion to understand the way in which mainstream rules might
impact minority groups. I have said little about what these fair criteria
should include. That is another challenge. 
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